There is a growing need for the use of active systems, systems that act automatically based on events. In many cases, providing such active functionality requires materializing (inferring) the occurrence of relevant events. A widespread paradigm for enabling such materialization is Complex Event Processing (CEP), a rule based paradigm, which currently relies on domain experts to fully define the relevant rules. These experts need to provide the set of basic events which serves as input to the rule, their inter-relationships, and the parameters of the events for determining a new event materialization. While it is reasonable to expect that domain experts will be able to provide a partial rules specification, providing all the required details is a hard task, even for domain experts. Moreover, in many active systems, rules may change over time, due to the dynamic nature of the domain. Such changes complicate even further the specification task, as the expert must constantly update the rules. As a result, we seek additional support to the definition of rules, beyond expert opinion. This work presents a mechanism for automating both the initial definition of rules and the update of rules over time. This mechanism combines partial information provided by the domain expert with machine learning techniques, and is aimed at improving the accuracy of event specification and materialization. The proposed mechanism consists of two main repetitive stages, namely rule parameter prediction and rule parameter correction. The former is performed by updating the parameters using an available expert knowledge regarding the future changes of parameters. The latter stage utilizes expert feedback regarding the actual past occurrence of events and the events materialized by the CEP framework to tune rule parameters. We also include possible implementations for both stages, based on a statistical estimator and evaluate our outcome using a case study from the intrusion detection domain.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the use of the Complex Event Processing paradigm has gained interest in applications such as sensor networks [12] , security applications (e.g., intrusion detection, bio hazards, computer security, and prevention of DoS attacks), engineering applications (e.g., forecasting networked resources availability), and scientific applications (e.g., grid resource utilization). In such applications, there is a need for sophisticated mechanisms to manage events and materialize new events from existing ones. Event materialization involves the generation of new, inferred events by the system, based on other events and some mechanism for predefined event pattern specifications. A rule (as in, e.g., Snoop [10] ), in particular, is an appealing representation for event materialization. Its declarative nature, combined with an optimized inference mechanism, allows systems to respond quickly to new and evolving situations by changing a set of rules rather than by making changes in code.
In current applications, rules need to be fully specified by users, typically domain experts. These experts need to provide the set of basic events that are needed for the inference of each materialized event, their inter-relationships, and a set of parameter values determining whether a new event should be materialized. Needless to say, incorrect specification of the intricate relationships between events in the real-world, or incorrect estimations of the relevant parameters or thresholds with regards to the impact on the materialization of a new event may cause rules to be materialized incorrectly. Due to the fact that such detailed event specification is a hard task, even for experts, the need for such specification may serve as a barrier for application of CEP in many domains.
To motivate our research and to illustrate the problem we shall use the application of active Computer Security Systems (CSS), which has grown to become one of the foremost concerns for IT professionals. Today's networks are large complex systems based on technology that was not necessarily designed with security in mind. Administrators must confront and react to increasingly sophisticated attacks and intrusions. In particular, detecting intrusions, whether in progress or post-mortem, has become necessary to protect entire networks, due to the social and legal fallout that can result from their improper and unauthorized use.
Consider a simple Intrusion Detection System [4] that infers the occurrence of intrusion events based on rules. A domain expert will probably be able to define the form of the rule. For example, an expert may provide the following rule information presented later in Section 4 (Example 1):
"If the size of the received packet from user has a high level of deviation from "normal" packet size with estimated size of m1 and standard deviation of stdev1, infer an event E1 representing the anomaly level of the packet size". However, it is usually more difficult for an expert to provide estimations for rule parameters, i.e. m1 -the expected size of a "normal" packet, the standard deviation (stdev1), and the distribution of the message size. Incorrect specification of these parameters could result in both intrusions not being detected correctly (false negatives) and normal network activity being falsely classified as a network intrusion attempt (false positive). Moreover, due to the dynamic nature of network traffic, the values of the above parameters as pertaining to the detection of network attacks may have to be periodically updated.
The problem of rule parameter determination and tuning can be simply stated as follows: given a set of rules, provide an initial value for the rule parameters, and modify them as required. Therefore, in the rule given above a rule tuning algorithm may determine that the m1 parameters should be replaced with m 1 < m1. The initial determination of rule parameters can be considered as a special case of tuning, with an initial value specified arbitrarily, and then corrected by the rule tuning algorithm. It is necessary for such a rule tuning to be tied with the ability of a system to correctly predict events. For example, if the m1 parameter is too high and as a result many intrusions were not detected by the system, a rule tuning algorithm should determine that a lower parameter is required.
Figure 1: The prediction-correction paradigm
In this work, we provide a theoretical framework and an algorithm for rule parameter determination and tuning, based on indirect expert feedback. Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration of our approach. The proposed model consists of two main repetitive stages, namely rule parameter prediction and rule parameter correction. The former utilizes any knowledge regarding how the rule parameters change over time, together with the events materialized by the inference algorithm to "predict" (or update) rule parameter values. The latter stage uses expert feedback regarding the actual occurrence of predicted events and the recently materialized events to update rule parameters for the next prediction stage. In this work, we also present an implementation of this framework based on concepts derived from Discrete Kalman Filters [24] , a powerful statistical estimator that supports estimations of past, present, and future states, even when the precise nature of the modeled system is unknown. We validate our solution using the MIT Lincoln Laboratory DARPA On-Line Intrusion Detection Evaluations data set [26] which is a first standard corpora for evaluation of computer network intrusion detection systems.
The paper makes the following contributions:
• We describe a framework for automating the task of specifying CEP rules, combining knowledge possessed by domain experts with intelligent techniques for specification of rule parameters -details that are hard for experts to provide.
• We describe a simple yet powerful model for rule parameter determination and tuning, taking into account any pre-existing knowledge regarding the updates of parameters over time, with indirect expert feedback.
• We develop an algorithm, based on Discrete Kalman Filters to determine and tune the parameter values.
• We present an initial empirical evaluation using realworld, well-known benchmark, showing the importance of continuously tuning rule parameters.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related work. Sections 3 and 4 introduces the rule parameter tuning model and mechanism. Section 5 presents a preliminary empirical evaluation and Section 6 concludes.
RELATED WORK
Our discussion of related work is partitioned into three parts: complex event processing (Section 2.1), intrusion detection (Section 2.2), and statistical estimators (Section 2.3).
Complex event processing
Complex event processing is supported by systems from various domains including active databases (e.g., Snoop [10] ), and the Situation Manager Rule Language ( [1] ), which is a general purpose language. Event management was also introduced in the area of business process management [14, 2] and service-based systems [13, 11, 22 ]. An excellent introductory book to complex event processing is also available [27] . A recent book introduces advances in distributed event-based systems, publish/subscribe and message filtering technologies [23] .
Various architectures for complex event processing were proposed, both generic (e.g., [7, 37, 18] ) and by extending middleware (e.g., [30, 6] ), exploring various facets of complex event processing. [5, 36] extended complex event processing to handle uncertainty. Recent works have focused on event stream modeling, proposing formal languages to support situations such as event negations [16] . Various aspects of event-oriented computing were discussed in CIDR 2007 (e.g., [15] ).
Complex event processing in security applications has gained attention in the community. [9] tailors probabilistic models or direct statistical models (e.g., regression) to support security event management. A more generic approach was proposed in [35] , where probabilistic events can be composed and the probability of complex events can be accurately computed . In [38] , an application of a physical intrusion detection was presented. A decentralized event-based system for tracking, analyzing, and controlling electronic document transactions in order to detect suspected insider misuse was presented in [3] . [20] introduces an event-driven architecture for automating video surveillance, orchestrating continuous and tasked video analysis algorithms, merging events from multiple sources, and gathering proactive information to handle missing or incomplete information.
Kalman filters were used in the context of complex event processing in [34] , where missing events in sensor data streams were predicted using Kalman filters.
To the best of our knowledge, none of the existing works in complex event processing have dealt with rule parameter tuning. Our aim is to propose a generic mechanism for rule parameter tuning, using intrusion detection as a case study. Figure 2 . The information system being protected (application, computer and/or network) is subject to a usage configuration or policy that describes legitimate actions of each entity (user, host or service) profile. Audit data describing entity actions or system states are generated (either systematically or triggered by the IDS) and then analyzed by the IDS, which evaluates the probability of these states or actions being related to an intrusion. Data processed by the IDS may be a sequence of commands executed by a user, a sequence of system calls launched by an application (for example a Web client), network packets, etc. Finally, the IDS can trigger some countermeasures to eliminate attack cause/effect, whenever an intrusion is detected.
Intrusion detection
Axelsson [4] separates intrusion detection techniques into signature-based and anomaly-based detection. The former must possess an attack description that can be matched to sensed attack manifestations. This can be as simple as a specific pattern that matches a portion of a network packet or as complex as a state machine or neural network description that maps multiple sensor outputs to abstract attack representations. If an appropriate abstraction can be found, signature-based systems can identify attacks that are abstractly equivalent to known patterns. Signatures that are too specific will miss minor variations on a known attack, while those that are too general can generate large numbers of false alarms. Such systems are inherently unable to detect truly novel attacks and suffer from a high rate of false alarms when signatures match both intrusive and non-intrusive sensor outputs [28] .
Anomaly-based detection equate "unusual" or "abnormal" with intrusions. Given a complete characterization of a noise distribution, an anomaly detector recognizes as intrusion an observation that does not appear to be noise alone. Such a mechanism needs to be trained on noise and has difficulty tracking natural changes in the noise distribution [28] . These changes can cause false alarms while intrusive activities that appear to be normal may cause missed detection. Several empirical studies [32, 25, 33] proposed Bayesian-Network-based Intrusion Detection mechanisms for anomaly-based detection.
While signature-based detection is more natural for rule representation, its sensitivity to changes led us to seek a rule representation for anomaly-based detection, a more challenging task. In this work we define rules based on the probability distribution function of explicit events features. By that, we decrease the role of domain experts in the rules formulation process to recognition of impacting factors, letting the system self-tune rule parameters.
Statistical Estimators
In this work we propose a rule tuning framework, combining current rule state estimation with the partial information provided by a domain expert. For this purpose, we seek machine learning techniques to preserve two main properties: first, the desired model should not assume a specific implementation of the correction and prediction stages; second, the desired model should be supervised, using provided domain expert feedback.
The family of statistical optimal estimators satisfy these properties. A good overview of optimal estimation process can be found in [19] . An optimal estimator is a computational algorithm that processes measurements to deduce the minimum error estimate of the state of a system by utilizing knowledge of system and measurement dynamics. It assumes systems are noisy and utilizes measurement errors and initial conditional information to filter out the noise. The main advantages of this type of data processor are that it a) minimizes the estimation error in a well defined statistical sense and b) combines all measurement data with prior knowledge about the system. [19] defines three main types of estimation problems (see Figure 3 , based on [19] , for illustration). When the time at which an estimate coincides with the last measurement point, the problem is referred to as filtering; when the time of interest falls within the span of available measurement data, the problem is termed smoothing; and when the time of interest occurs after the last available measurement, the problem is called prediction. In addition, we may differentiate between three categories of estimation problems, namely Model Based vs. Non-parametric estimators; Bayesian vs. Classical estimators and Online vs. Batch estimators.
The proposed framework is based on the Kalman Estimator which is a simple type of supervised, Bayesian, predictcorrect estimators and therefore preserve all the desired properties of the machine learning model for our needs. A brief overview of the Kalman Estimator is presented in the appendix.
MODEL
In this work we use a discrete model of time. Let (t1, t2, ...) be a sequence of time points, whose granularity is application dependent (e.g., minutes or microseconds). Time is partitioned into intervals τ1, τ2, ... such that each time interval contains one or more time points and for τi = (t = t i n + 1 (there are no gaps in setting time intervals). In the rest of this section we discuss events (Section 3.1), rules (Section 3.2), and system states (Section 3.3).
Events
We define an event e to be an actual occurrence or happening that is significant (falls within a domain of discourse), instantaneous (takes place at a specific time point), and atomic (it either occurs or not). We acknowledge that such a definition may be limiting for certain purposes, yet it suits our specific needs. Examples of events include notifications of login attempt, failures of IT components, and a person entering or leaving a certain geographical area.
Collectively, events represent a state of the domain of discourse. Therefore, we can define an event history h j i to be a set of all events (of interest to the system), as well as their associated data, whose occurrence time falls between ti and tj. We denote by e (t) the set of all events that occured at time t. Whenever the time specification ti and tj is immaterial to our discussion, we use the generic history term h. We denote by H the set of all possible histories.
Similar to other works in this area, [15, 5] an event notification is represented as an Event Instance Data (EID), a tuple of the structure < id, time, val >, where id is an attribute, identifying uniquely each event instance, time is an attribute that contains the time an event was reported to occur, and val is a set of attributes, specific to an event. Also, we classify events into event classes, where all events in an event class c share the same set of attributes. For example, an event that represents a typed message in a system can have the structure M SG =< id, time, length >, where length represents the reported length of the message.
Event notifications provide an estimated state of the domain of discourse. Events may occur but not notified, due to, e.g., failure in routers. Also, events may be notified although they never occurred due to faulty equipment. Therefore, we define in a parallel fashion to event history an estimated event historyĥ j i to be a set of all notified events (of interest to the system), as well as their associated data, whose occurrence time falls between ti and tj. Whenever the time specification ti and tj is immaterial to our discussion, we use the generic estimated history termĥ.
We differentiate between two types of events. Explicit events are events signaled by event sources. For example, a new network connection request is an explicit event signaled by the network sniffers. Inferred events are the events materialized by the system based on other events (either explicit or inferred), which we term evidence events. For example, an illegal connection attempt event is an inferred event materialized by the network security system, based on the explicit event of a new network connection, and an inferred event of unsuccessful user authorization.
Inferred events, just like explicit events, belong to event histories. Here, we also make the differentiation between inferred events that actually occurred in the real world to those who are only estimated to occur. The former will be present in h while the latter will be present inĥ.
Rules
Events in our model are inferred using rules. For ease of exposition, we refrain from presenting complete rule language syntax. Rather, we represent a rule by a quadruple, r = sr, pr, ar, mr defining the necessary conditions for the materialization of new events. Such a quadruple can be implemented in a variety of ways, such as a set of database queries using SQL statements. We detail next each of the rule elements, illustrating them with the following simplified example of a security network system that consist of the following single rule: "If a content length of a packet received from a user is greater than l bytes, then infer a network attack attempt event and block the user".
sr is a selection function that filters relevant events according to rule r. sr receives an event history h as input, and returns hr such that hr ⊆ h. It is the role of the selection expression to filter out events that are irrelevant to the inference process according to r. We say that event e ∈ h is relevant (or selectable) according to rule r iff e ∈ sr (h). For example, a new packet receive event is relevant to the materialization of a network attack attempt event.
pr is a predicate, defined over a filtered event history, determining when events become candidates for materialization. Formally, given a set of events in a filtered history h, pr is a Boolean function pr : h → {true, f alse}. For example, for inferring an attempt to attack the network, pr may be of the form "An attempt to attack the network is made if x packets from a user with length greater than l bytes received within y minutes."
The third function ar is an association function, whose role is to define how many events should be materialized, as well as which subsets of selectable events are associated with each materialized event. ar : h → 2 h is a function from a set of selectable events to its power set. It returns subsets of events, such that each subset is associated with a newly materialized event. Continuing with our example, ar will include two events, one of type new packet receive and another of type anomaly packet length.
Finally, mr is a mapping function, determining the attribute values of the materialized event. Formally, mr : A → e, such that A ∈ ar (sr (h)). For each event set in ar (sr (h)), mr determines a set of attribute values of a materialized event of type cr. For ease of exposition, we assume that a rule materializes a single event type. In our example, an event of anomaly packet may include an attribute of anomaly level and the function mr will determine its value.
System state and feedback
While it is expected that experts will be able to specify the form (or template) of sr, pr, ar, and mr, the full specification of these functions usually depend on specifying a set of rule parameters. For example, the rule for identifying a break-in attempt has two parameters, x and y. While we expect an expert to provide the above form, the exact specification of x and y will probably be more difficult for an expert to provide. Therefore, we would like to automate parameter specification.
We collectively define the set of all rule parameters to be the system state. Given a time interval τ k = (t k i , ...t k j ] and n rule parameters we denote the system state in τ k as x k ∈ n . Recalling Figure 1 , our framework learns and updates the system state in two stages, namely rule parameter prediction and rule parameter update. In rule parameter prediction, unsupervised learning is carried out, i.e., rule parameters are updated without any expert feedback, and is based on any pre-existing knowledge regarding how the parameters may change over time, as well as on the constantly updated history h of explicit and materialized events.
In rule parameter update, the parameters are tuned in a supervised fashion, utilizing expert feedback. Expert feedback may be given in two forms, namely direct and indirect. Direct feedback involves changes to the system state while indirect feedback provides an assessment on the correctness of the estimated event historyĥ. An example of the former is an actual set of rule parameters for the last τ interval, and of the latter is the provision of the history h (correcting the estimated historyĥ for that period). To illustrate the difference between direct and indirect feedback, consider the security network system example given above, with l as the rule parameter. A direct feedback may be defined as an actual minimal packet length indicating the network attack, and an indirect feedback may be defined as the actual occurrence of network attacks inferred by the system. Therefore, such an indirect feedback may be in the form of marking an event e ∈ĥ as non-existent or by suggesting an event occurrence at time t so that e is not inĥ. The indirect feedback may be also provided using the CEP framework log data or by combining multiple experts information.
RULE TUNING MECHANISM
Using the model of Section 3, we now describe the rule tuning mechanism for quantifying rule parameter values. Our mechanism is based on the idea of two repetitive stages, namely rule parameter prediction and rule parameter correction, as presented in Figure 1 . The rule parameter prediction is based on the constantly updated history of already materialized events and allow inference of complex events using the predicted rule parameter values. The stage of rule parameter correction is based on expert feedback of actual occurrence of predicted events and the recently materialized events allowing update to rule parameter in preparation for the next prediction stage.
For demonstrating our approach, consider Example 1. 
, first, analyzing a feature of an explicit event and, second, infering a new feature anomaly event defining the extent to which this connection session attribute is considered to be anomalous. The inference logic of these rules is as follows:
• Rule r1, srcBytesRule, presented in Section 3, infers event of type E1, representing the anomaly level of the packet length received from the source, based on the learned normal distribution parameters.
• Rule r2, dstBytesRule, is similar to r1 and infers event of type E2, representing the anomaly level of the packet length received from the destination user, based on the dst-bytes attribute of the explicit event E0.
• Rule r3, serrorRateRule, based on the serrorRate explicit event attribute, infers event of type E3, representing the anomaly level of percentage of connections within a 3-minute time window that have "SYN" errors.
• Rule r4, based on the srvRate explicit event attribute, infers event of type E4 representing the anomaly level of percentage of different open connections within a 3-minute time window.
• Rule r5 analyzes the inferred attribute anomaly events of types E1, ...E4, inferring the integrated anomaly event (type E5). The rule parameter, a threshold of an integrated anomaly level, is learned using Algorithm 1. We base our framework on a predictor-corrector type estimator that estimates the state of a dynamic system from a series of noisy events. In particular, we propose to use the idea behind a Discrete Kalman Filter [24] . The Kalman filter estimates a process by using a form of feedback control, Table 1 : Case study rules as illustrated in Figure 5 . The filter estimates the process state at some time and then obtains feedback in the form of (noisy) measurements. As such, the equations for the Kalman The specific Discrete Kalman Filter equations [24] can only be used in the presence of direct expert feedback, i.e., when providing revisions to parameter values. In what follows we show a formulation of a solution for the indirect feedback case, where experts provide information on the correctness of event inferencing. We start by detailing the model which serves as the basis for the Rule Tuning Method (Section 4.1). Then, we present the predict-correct equation set that serves the method main stages. Finally, we propose a general sequence of repetitive stages which are performed in this framework.
Rule Tuning Model
The rule tuning model consists of two recursive equations. The time equation describes the change of rule parameters over time. The history equation describes the outcome of a set of rules using a given set of parameters.
Recall that
n k } ∈ n represents the system state at time interval τ k , containing n rule parameters, and that h j i represents the event history in the time interval (ti, ...tj]. We denote the start and the end times of a time interval τ k as s(k) and f (k), respectively and therefore, h
represents the event history in the time interval τ . Definition 1. Given a system state x k−1 that starts at time s(k − 1) and ends at time f (k − 1) and actual event history h
, a time equations is a function ϕ :
n ×H → n so that:
Definition 1 provides the basic parameter transition formula, in which an actual history of the τ k−1 interval and the system state at τ k−1 are transformed into a new system state x k . The choice of history length is generally affected by the expected stability of the system state. Therefore, a more dynamic environment calls for a shorter history since less recent information is already outdated. For an extremely stable environment, one would expect that the use of the whole history h
would shorten the learning of the system state. We explore this matter further in Section 5.4.
There can be several reasons to dynamic changes in rule parameters over time. Firstly, natural stochastic magnitude which depends on the previous rule parameter value. For instance, returning to Example 1, consider an uncertainty about the normal length of packet received from the source during the service connection. Particularly, for each time interval τ k the "normal" packet length remains constant over the next time interval τ k+1 with some high probability pc, and increases or decreases by 10% with the same small probability 1−pc 2 . Since the integrated anomaly level is influenced by these changes, the tuned parameter of minimal anomaly level should be updated too.
Another reason involves periodic environment changes. For instance, using Example 1, consider there is some periodic change (day vs. night) in the distribution of normal number of open network connections during a 3-minutes window. The tuned parameter of minimal anomaly level is influenced by these periodic changes.
Finally, rules themselves may cause dynamic changes in parameters. For example, consider the following two rules: R1: "If the number of messages received from the user exceeds N messages, infer an intrusion event and block the user" and R2: "Decrease the rule parameter N by 30% on the next period if an intrusion event inferred during the last period." If the parameter N of rule R1 is part of the system state, then the rule R2 must be included in the time equation in order to perform the required update.
Definition 2. At time interval τ k = (s(k), f (k)] let x k be the system state and let the set of explicit events be {e s(k) , . . . , e f (k) }.
Let the function
Definition 2 provides the basic history equation: for time interval τ k , Eq. 2 generates the inferred history, based on the set of rule parameters x k and the set of explicit events {e s(k) , . . . , e f (k) } during τ k and the event history h
Inf er is the function that performs a sequence of inference activities in the time interval τ k and returns a new event historyĥ
The history equation describes a transformation of the actual system state x k into history h f (k) s(k) . However, this equation cannot be materialized in our rule tuning mechanism, since the actual system state is unknown and we may only estimate it, predict, and correct it iteratively. Therefore, Definition 3 presents the estimated event history equation, aimed at defining the connection between the estimated system statex k and the estimated event historyĥ
Definition 3. At time interval τ k = (s(k), f (k)] letx k be the estimated system state and the set of explicit events be {e s(k) , . . . , e f (k) }. The estimated event history equation is defined to be:
Definition 3 serves us in evaluating the inference mechanism performance at the end of each time interval. This evaluation must be performed for two main reasons. First, it has a pivotal role in parameter tuning, may it be manual (by a system administrator) or automatic (using a model like the one proposed in this work). Second, there are cases where a system cannot reach 100% correctness or that increased correctness is expensive. For example, in IDS for banking systems, reaching performance correctness above 90% may require the transfer of all user logins for each period to the IDS central computer, leading to increased resources load. Another reason for such a limitation in intrusion detection systems is the possible increase in the number of false alarms, reducing the system level of service. Figure 6 illustrates four different outcomes of such comparison. A true positive (TP) instance occurs whenever intrusion event was correctly inferred by the mechanism. A false positive (FP) is identified whenever an event was incorrectly inferred as intrusion. Whenever the lack of an event was correctly identified as such, it is referred to as a true negative (TN) and finally false negative (FN) instance occurs whenever an event occurred yet was not inferred by the system.
Based on this categorization, we can measure the inference mechanism performance for each time interval τ k and for some event class c using the known Information Retrieval measure of precision and recall. In our model, the precision is the percentage of correctly inferred events (i.e. true positive) relative to the total number of events inferred in this time interval (i.e. true and false positives). Particularly, for IDS evaluation it may be defined as the percentage of correctly inferred intrusion events relatively to all the events, identified as intrusion.
In our model, the recall measures the percentage of correctly inferred events (i.e., true positive) relative to the actual total number of events occurred in this time interval. Particularly, for IDS evaluation it may be defined as the percentage of correctly inferred normal events relatively to all the actual intrusion events. In addition, we shall use a false positive rate, termed falseAlarm, to identify the percentage of incorrectly inferred events (i.e., false positives) relative to the number of explicit events in the time interval τ k (i.e., false and true negatives).
Predict-Correct Rule stages
Recall that the proposed framework estimates a process by using a form of feedback control: we estimate the process state at some point in time and then obtain feedback in the form of (noisy) measurements. The equations fall into two groups, namely time update or predict equations and measurement update or correct equations.
A Kalman filter is optimal in that is seeks to minimize the expected value of the square magnitude of the posterior state estimation. Translating it into our model, we seek to improve the correctness of a rule parameter vector by evaluating posterior performance of the inference mechanism based on the inferred events and the actual event history. For this purpose, we propose to use three well known evaluation criteria, namely precision, recall and falseAlarm rate.
In what follows, we shall use the following two variables:
•x k|k -the estimate of rule parameters at time interval
given sets of rules parameters values up to and including time f (k).
• P k|k -the performance of the inference mechanism during time interval τ k based on the estimated event historyĥ
s(k) and the actual history h
Before going into technical details, we illustrate the overall approach using Example 1. At the beginning of each time interval, our mechanism predicts the minimal integrated anomaly level for inferring the intrusion events and at the end of each time interval, based on the expert feedback h and the estimated historyĥ, inferred by the inference mechanism, the rule parameter are evaluated and corrected.
Predict stage
The predict stage at time interval τ k uses updated rule parameters, as estimated in the previous time interval τ k−1
s(k−1) ) (7)
Figure 8: General Rule Correction equations
to produce the system state estimate for τ k . In addition, it evaluates the inference mechanism performance for the current period, based on the updated event history estimate for the previous time interval, inferred from the corrected system state, and the provided expert feedback. The general framework equations appear in Figure 7 . The function ϕ, discussed in Section 4.1, takes into account the existing source of dynamic rules parameter changes and the previous time interval rule parameter values to evaluate the values for the coming time interval. The predefined noise function DN (k − 1) adds some natural noise that exists in the rules parameters setting process. The evaluation of the next time interval performance P k|k−1 is motivated by the idea that the improved performance, achieved after correction of the system state on the previous time interval, may serve us as an estimate for the future performance.
Correct stage
The correct phase evaluates the performance of the inference mechanism using expert's actual event history h f (k) s(k) for the interval τ k and the inferred event historyĥ f (k) s(k) . It then corrects the rule parameters according to this evaluation. For this purpose we use a predefined correction function U , as shown in Figure 8 .
The correction function U may be defined based on a wide spectrum of data learning methods such as statistical learning and machine learning techniques: A simple statistical learning may help us to correct parameters values based on past explicit events. For example, in the IDS case, the mean of the normal message length may be corrected based on the past N normal messages; Supervised Machine Learning Techniques based on the past explicit events and the provided expert feedback, may generate a global model, which, by mapping explicit events into the parameter values, will perform the correction stage. A wide number of such a techniques may be found in the literature: decision tree learning, Support Vector Machines, Nearest Neighbor Algorithm are only a few well known examples. Example 2 provides a specific possible algorithm of the correction stage.
Example 2. Consider Example 1 detailed above in this Section. Recall that the tuned parameter in Example 1 was defined as a minimal integrated anomaly level. Assume the correct stage is implemented based on the following supervised learning method: at the end of each time interval τ k , based on the feedback provided by expert (i.e., the actual history h f (k) s(k) ), we measure the average(score) as an average anomaly level score calculated over the actual intrusion connections. Then we calculate the weighted average between the current minimal anomaly level parameterx k|k−1 and the received average(score), giving a slight preference to the current parameter value. Algorithm 2 details the specific implementation of this method. In this way for each time interval the method tries to find an optimal state of the rule parameter leading to the best inference performance. Note, the proposed implementation does not use as input the system performance for the current period.
Algorithm 2 Anomaly Threshold Update Algorithm
Another method for implementing the update parameter stage is as follows. We can cast the learning problem as an optimization problem, using a generic optimization method to obtain the best parameter values with the aim of optimizing a quantity that measures the quality of the learned results. For example, in the IDS example, we would like to find the best value for the threshold parameter, optimizing the precision measure. Examples of optimization methods that could be applied here are meta heuristics such as Tabu Search [21] and Cross Entropy [8] . A major benefit of such a method is the fact that it is generic, i.e., it can be applied regardless of the form of the individual rules and the rule tree. In addition, it can be extended, using methods for multi objective optimization, to cases in which there are several measures for the quality of learning (e.g., precision, recall and false alarms). The Rule Tuning Method consists of a repetitive sequence of actions that should be performed for correct evaluation and dynamic update of rule parameters. The sequence is detailed below and illustrated in Figure 9. 1. Prediction Stage.
Rule Tuning Method
• Predict the estimated set of rules parametersx k based on the rules prediction equation (Eq. (4)).
• Predict the inference mechanism performance level based on the previous time interval updated event history estimate, inferred using corrected rule parametersx k−1|k−1 , and the actual event history as provided by an expert (Eq. (6)).
2. Inference mechanism performing Stage.
• During τ k , for each new explicit event infer a new estimated event history setĥ
s(k) (Eq. (7)).
• At the end of τ k , receive from the expert the actual event history h
Rules Correction Stage
• Calculate posterior precision of the inference mechanism performance for the current interval τ k , based on the inferred eventsĥ
s(k) and the actual event history h (8)).
• Correct the estimated rule parameter setx k based on the predefined correction logic. (Eq. (9)) 4. Return to the first stage for the next time interval τ k+1 .
An initial parameter setupx0, from which the rule tuning method starts may be gathered from a domain expert information. As discussed before, such an initial definition of rule parameters may be a very sophisticated task. Therefore, we propose to combine the initial expert evaluation with our rule tuning method for a more precise definition of rule parameters. This requires some training data.
EMPIRICAL EXPERIENCES
In this section we describe a preliminary empirical study aimed at studying the performance of the proposed rule tuning method of Section 4. We examine the rule tuning method initial learning process and then the ability of the mechanism to correct rule parameters over time. We also investigate the influence of event history length and rule set complexity on the training performance. Section 5.1 introduces the case study in details and the experiment setup is given in Section 5.2. The experiments are presented and discuss in Sections 5.3-5.6.
Case study and data set
As a data set we use the MIT Lincoln Laboratory DARPA Off-Line Intrusion Detection Evaluations data set (DARPA 1999 [26] ) which is a first standard corpus for evaluation of computer network intrusion detection systems. In our experiments we used the KDD'99 dataset, a subset of DARPA dataset [17] . The data set was preprocessed by extracting 41 features from the tcpdump data in the 1998 DARPA data set. The KDD'99 dataset can be used without further timeconsuming preprocessing and can serve as a benchmark for comparing various IDSs. For simplicity sake, we define a simple inference mechanism as a binary classification of all connection, namely normal/attack, and only five of the most attack indicating attributes were extracted from the dataset.
Experiment setup
The rule parameter tuning model was implemented based on Section 4, with the correct stage implemented using the statistical method proposed in Example 2. The experiments environment was implemented in Java version 1.6.03, using JDK version 5.0, on the Windows Vista operating system, and were carried out on a single computer with 2038MB of memory and an Intel(R) Core(TM)2 Duo CPU.
We divided all the train and test data sets into 40 time intervals, each with 50 explicit events. We emulate an initial rule parameters, provided by a domain expert, to be such that maximizes precision and minimizes false alarms. This setting represents an extreme point in which a domain expert forces an IDS system to report on intrusion only with very high certainty.
The performance of the Rule Tuning Mechanism is measured using Precision, Recall and FalseAlarm measures detailed in Section 4.1. We ran each experiment 10 times with different random permutation of explicit events order and measured average performance, to avoid statistical biases.
Stability analysis
In our first experiment, we have examined the learning capabilities of the model. We ran the algorithm on the training set, starting from a set of parameters that emphasize precision and false alarms over recall. We aimed at training two parameters, namely totalScore1 and totalScore2 of rule r5. The parameters were tuned using Algorithm 1, which promotes a balance between precision and recall using their harmonic means (F-measure) and the falseAlarm measure. Figure 10 illustrates the outcome of this experiment. The proposed mechanism converges after less than 25 iterations to a system state that balances precision with recall, increasing the false alarm rate as a consequence. This stable state allows a good estimation of intrusions (both precision and recall above 80%) with less than 20% false alarms.
Training length
In the second experiment we study the influence of event history length on the performance of the inference mechanism. Gain, we used the training component of the data set with varying length of event history. Event history length plays a role in Eq. 9. The training component of the data set is stable, with no major fluctuations in the rate and characteristics of intrusions. Therefore, one would expect a positive correlation between performance and history length. Figure 11 provides the performance at the end of the train- ing period as a function of the number of intervals that were used to recompute the threshold. Precision increases from about 60% for a single interval to more than 80%. FalseAlarms increases with precision, as expected. However, with a training size of 25 intervals it goes down to around 25% while precision remains high. Recall stays stable and high. The stable characteristics of the training set is evident in the performance for "all history," where the proposed mechanism use all past intervals for the training. There, we see a performance of Recall around 90%, Precision at 80% and FalseAlarm less than 20%. A similar tendency is observed when applying the learned parameters on the test data. According to [17] , the test data introduces slightly different threats than the train data and therefore we may expect the tuned parameter to be less effective. Figure 12 illustrates the results. The initial parameter for the train data is the parameter that was learned at the end of the training period. We measured the performance of the first period of the test data using the parameter from the training data. We observe that when learning was done using a single interval period, the performance deteriorated significantly in terms of FalseAlarms and to a lesser extend in terms of Recall. Precision was only slightly improved. With longer history for training we see an improved performance for the test data as well.
Managing dynamic data
We now study the importance of continuous rule parameter control. For this purpose we again use the test data and the learned parameter from the train data as a starting point. We let the predict-correct mechanism to continuously update the rule parameter and measure the success of this update at the final interval of the test data. Figure 13 shows the percentage of improvement with respect to the initial parameter, learned using the train data. We again varied the length of the event history. The results show a gradual improvement of precision and relative stability of recall. FalseAlarm improves for a history of up to 10 intervals and the it shows deterioration. The initial high improvement comes from the rather poor performance of the training period. This is later balanced with the improvement in precision (which increases falseAlarms. The graph converges to no-improvement at two points. The first, with history size around 10 − 15 intervals represents a balancing point between precision and falseAlarm. The second point, when all history is used, stems from the quality learning of the training period. It is worth noting that although the test data uses different intrusion patterns, the difference is not big, otherwise the use of all possible history would most likely yield a different result. We differ the empirical evaluation of this hypothesis to future research.
Complex rule parameter tuning
In our final experiment, we have simulated a setting in which a complex set of rule parameters need to be tuned. Consider Example 1 and assume that all the parameters in Table 2 need to be determined. Such a setting is in particular hard for domain experts due to the indirect influence of the explicit events on the threshold parameters totalScore1 and totalScore2. Also, multi-criterion decision making (such as balancing Precision, Recall, and falseAlarms) is also a challenging cognitive task.
In this experiment, we have emulated a domain expert by defining an incremental update tool. The aim of this tool was to maximize the F-measure among multiple time intervals while each interval contained the same explicit events set. For each time interval, the tool increased the learning parameter, if the F-measure, estimated at the end of the interval, raised relatively to the previous one. The tool was continuously trained till no improvement in F-measure was recognized. At each time interval we used the whole training set for the tuning. In addition, the tuning of each rule parameter was done independently.
In order to simplify the tuning process for the domain expert, separate threshold parameters {tr1, . . . , tr4} for each event type {E1, . . . , E4} respectively were defined. If for at least one of the inferred events {E1, . . . , E4} the relevant threshold was exceeded, then the rule r5 inferred a positive intrusion event E5.
In this experiment, our Rule Tuning method used the whole training data at each time interval and was contin- uously trained till exceeded some predefined level of recall, precision and falseAlarm. The parameters, tuned in this experiment, were the same as in the previous experiments. Table 3 summarized the results for this experiment, measured after testing the resulting rule parameters on the test dataset. The results show that the "expert", attempting to improve F-measure, reached a 100% of false alarm (determining all events as attacks) with a very high Recall (recognizing almost all attacks) and medium Precision. The rule tuning mechanism preserved a relatively low level of 22% of falseAlarm, with much better precision, balanced against a medium recall. The experiment serves as a motivation for using the rule tuning mechanism when complex tuning is needed.
Discussion
The preliminary set of experiments presented in this section shows good potential and can serve as a proof-of-concept of the proposed model and mechanism. Training is beneficial and continuous tuning can compensate for changes in dynamic environments. Automatic tuning becomes beneficial in settings where manual tuning of a complex set of parameters becomes a cognitive challenge. Nevertheless, our implementation is far from being optimal. As was shown in [25, 29] , carefully tailored systems for a specific set of threats can achieve comparable or better results than a generic solution such as the one proposed in this paper. In [29] falseAlarm was below 2.6% with Precision above 90% and varying Recall (14%-99%). In [25] , Recall of above 90% was achieved falseAlarms just above 0.3%. While these systems were tailor-made to the specific Lincoln data challenge, we still see a room for improvement even with a generic solution.
CONCLUSIONS
In this work we presented a model and a mechanism for automatically deriving rule parameters. The motivation for this work stems from the difficulty domain expertsexperience in providing accurate parameter specification in a complex system with many rules and parameter interrelationships. Our model provides a one-time parameter derivation mechanism as well as a continuous adjustment of parameters based on a correct-predict paradigm and involves a continuous adjustment to parameters using machine learning techniques. Our approach follows that of Kalman estimators, modified to take into account indirect, rather than direct feedback. This is as domain experts provide feedback on the accuracy of event materialization, rather than on the parameter values themselves.
An empirical analysis we have performed using a data set for intrusion detection systems shows the benefit of the approach in initial learning and continuous adaptation in a dynamic environment. Moreover, we have shown that the benefit of using the automatic system, compared to estimates provided by a domain expert, increases as the complexity of the event model increases.
We have presented two examples for potential learning algorithms for our model -a generic algorithm based on optimization techniques and a specific algorithm for the IDS model. A significant direction for future work involves creating learning algorithms specific to the generic rules framework described in this paper, by utilizing the relationship between the a specific rule tree and models for which advanced learning algorithms exists. For example, utilizing the relationships between rule trees and Bayesian Networks can enable taking advantage of Bayesian Network based learning algorithms.
While the initial analysis is promising, we would like to also analyze the relationship between the quality of the initial parameter setting (as given by a domain expert) and the period of needed training. A follow-up to this work would find robust ways of identifying good initial parameter values.
We would also like to analyze performance of learning algorithms based as optimization techniques. Finally, having a flexible mechanism, in which priorities can be set among the performance indicators should be built and evaluated.
